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Abstract
Using data for the 1990’s, this paper examines the role of sheepskin eﬀects in the re-
turns to education for Japan. Our estimation results indicate that sheepskin eﬀects
explain about 50% of the total returns to schooling. We further ﬁnd that sheepskin
eﬀect are only important for workers in small ﬁrms with the size of these eﬀects
being similar to comparable estimates for the US. Finally, the estimated sheepskin
eﬀects are decreasing with ﬁrm tenure, in particular for small ﬁrms. These results
could be explained by the particular recruitment system of large ﬁrms in Japan,
which makes university diploma as a screening device unimportant for large ﬁrms.
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The economic literature faces a long-lasting debate on the causes of the positive
relationship between schooling and earnings. According to the human capital the-
ory, skills obtained in school directly increase productivity which in turn results in
higher earnings. According to the screening theory of education, schooling enhances
earnings because it is used as a signaling device that allows employers to assess the
innate productivity of potential employees, not because schooling makes individu-
als more productive per se (Arrow 1973, Spence 1973). A widely used empirical
approach to evaluate the validity of the screening hypothesis is to test for the ex-
istence of sheepskin eﬀects in the returns to schooling, because signiﬁcant returns
to a diploma conditional on completed years of schooling indicates that education
acts as a screening device that credentiates higher innate productivity in addition
to potential direct productivity eﬀects.1
Existing empirical evidence on sheepskin eﬀects is almost exclusively based on
data for the US. This paper aims to test for the existence of sheepskin eﬀects in the
returns to schooling using individual data from Japan. From investigating the role of
sheepskin eﬀects in a labor market that diﬀers substantially from the labor market in
the US, we aim to provide additional insights to the human capital theory-screening
hypothesis debate.
Starting in the 1960s, a period of rapid economic growth, long-term relationships
between employers and employees became the norm in most Japanese ﬁrms. This
“lifetime employment system” reﬂects the tendency of Japanese companies to make
considerable investments in the skills of their employees through in-house training
in order to adapt more quickly to changing economic situations and technological
developments (JIL-Tokyo 2001). The expectation that an employee stays in a ﬁrm
1for the rest of his working-life should give ﬁrms incentives to make considerable
screening eﬀorts before hiring an individual. Indeed, especially large Japanese ﬁrms
tend to recruit new employees directly from universities, which is usually preceded
by substantial screening through written examinations and interviews by the ﬁrm
while applicants are still at the university (Hart and Kawasaki 1999, JIL-Tokyo
2001). Because of this special recruitment system, Japanese employers possess al-
ready considerable information on the innate productivity of their employees at the
time of hiring, which in turn implies a secondary role of university diplomas as a
screening device. Thus, we expect the returns to diplomas conditional on years of
schooling to be lower in Japan than in the US. Since usually large Japanese cor-
porations adopt the above-mentioned recruitment system, we further expect the
importance of sheepskin eﬀects in Japan to decrease with ﬁrm-size.
In addition to sheepskin eﬀects, the dynamic relationship between the returns to
schooling and labor market experience or ﬁrm tenure has often been used to test the
signaling model against the human capital model. This test relies on the hypothesis
that if education acts as a signal, the partial eﬀect of schooling on earnings will
decline with increasing labor market experience of an individual, because employers
gradually obtain better information on the true productivity of a worker (Bauer and
Haisken-DeNew 2001, Farber and Gibbons 1996, Layard and Psacharopoulos 1974,
Riley 1979). In this study we test this hypothesis by investigating the development
of sheepskin eﬀects with increasing ﬁrm tenure. If the learning hypothesis is correct,
the estimated coeﬃcients of interactions between diploma dummies and ﬁrm tenure
in a standard wage equation should be negative. In the institutional setting of the
Japanese labor market, we expect sheepskin eﬀects to decrease with ﬁrm tenure
especially for individuals employed in small ﬁrms.
In the following section, we give a short description of the Japanese schooling
2and recruitment system. Section III describes the data set and our empirical ap-
proach. Section IV presents the estimation results for various speciﬁcations. Our
baseline speciﬁcation closely follows existing studies for the US to facilitate compa-
rability across the two countries. We further investigate whether there are signiﬁcant
ﬁrm-size-diﬀerences in the estimated sheepskin eﬀects and whether sheepskin eﬀects
disappear with increasing job tenure. Section V concludes.
Education and Labor Market Recruitment in Japan
The structure of the Japanese educational system is very similar to that of the US,
with compulsory education lasting 9 years, 6 years of which are primary school fol-
lowed by 3 years of lower secondary school. After compulsory schooling, individuals
in Japan typically attend additional 3 years of upper secondary school. Completion
of upper secondary school allows individuals to proceed either to a junior college,
which usually requires additional 2 years, or to university (see Table I). Conditional
on attending university, a Bachelor degree could be obtained after 4 years.
Approximately 70% of the Japanese universities are private. They diﬀer in their
level of prestige and are structured similar to those in the US. Only a very small
number of individuals attain only minimum compulsory education. Over the 1990s,
at least 90% of all individuals receiving new diplomas ﬁnished either upper secondary
or some other higher level of schooling. Between 1993 and 1997 more than 40% of
new labor market entrants had a higher educational degree (JIL-Tokyo 2001).
The Japanese curricula places more emphasize on general knowledge and self-
development than on acquiring specialized knowledge at an early stage. Formal
education is rather understood as a general qualiﬁcation for the professional life
than for a certain occupation. A “streaming” of students similar to the process
3in many other developed countries does not take place. In the short period of
transition from school to work, however, there is nonetheless an intensive selection
process. The Japanese system of recruitment and job placement also diﬀers from
that of most Western countries in that it is highly structured and strictly organized.
Japanese ﬁrms tend to recruit new employees directly from schools and universities
with substantial screening (Hart and Kawasaki 1999).
Japan developed a stable job placement system that involves ﬁrms, schools and
administrative services, allowing a smooth transition from school to work. Through-
out the process, schools play a very important role, with high schools providing
career consultation to students to help them determine their future career path, i.e.
whether they should enter the labor market after completion of upper secondary
school or whether they should proceed to higher education. Every year, companies
provide job information to the public employment security oﬃces, who in turn pass
this information on to schools. Teachers then recommend students to the appro-
priate ﬁrms. Compared to their western counterparts, young people in Japan start
their job search activities very early, because there is only a small time window
between graduation in March of a given year and when new work contracts begin
on April 1. Thus, job applications and job entrance examinations start up to one
year before students leave the educational system.
Although universities oﬀer job placement services to their students, recruitment
of university graduates is not as strictly organized as in upper secondary schools. As
described in JIL-Tokyo (2001), students also apply directly to ﬁrms by themselves.
Already at the end of their junior year, students can attend information sessions
held by companies. Those who apply, go through several examinations and two or
three interviews during their studies until ﬁnal employment decisions are made. The
selection criteria of Japanese ﬁrms concentrate on general abilities that indicate a
4potential basis for the further development through on-the-job training (Hart and
Kawasaki 1999). Note that the Japanese recruitment system is used predominantly
by large ﬁrms. In 1999, for example, only between 4.4% and 5.0% of ﬁrms with less
than 100 employees utilized this recruitment system (JIL-Tokyo 2001).
Based on the special recruitment system in Japan, we derive two hypotheses
concerning the role of schooling degrees as a screening device that will be tested in
our empirical analysis. First, compared to other countries without such a strictly
organized placement system, we expect sheepskin eﬀects in Japan to be less im-
portant than, e.g., in the US, since the system provides ﬁrms already considerable
information on the innate productivity of applicants when they sign an employment
contract, making the role of schooling degrees as screening device less important.
Second, since predominantly large ﬁrms utilize this recruitment system, we expect
sheepskin eﬀects and learning eﬀects (i.e., a decrease in the diploma eﬀects with
increasing ﬁrm tenure) to be more important in small ﬁrms.
Description of the Data and Empirical Approach
In this paper we use the Japanese Panel Survey on Consumers (JPSC), a data
set of approximately 1,000 men, collected and made available by the Institute for
Household Economy in Tokyo.2 For the analysis, we use data from 1993 to 1997.
Men working in the agricultural sector or in the public service have been excluded
from the analysis. In addition, we disregarded all observations with missing values
to one of the variables used in the empirical analysis leading to a ﬁnal sample of 735
full-time working men, comprising a total of 2,814 person-year observations.
Many existing empirical studies of sheepskin eﬀects do not have a direct mea-
sure of degree receipt. These studies estimate sheepskin eﬀects by specifying a spline
5function of completed years of schooling with discontinuous knots at the usual num-
ber of years needed to complete a degree. Using data from the CPS, Jaeger and Page
(1996) have shown that these studies usually underestimate sheepskin eﬀects of high
school and college degrees. Similar to the data used by Jaeger and Page (1996), the
JPSC provides information on both years of schooling and degrees received, which
allows us to avoid the bias of studies imputing degree receipt from the usual years
of education. For each level of education the JPSC provides detailed information
as to whether one merely started and whether one actually completed the degree or
certiﬁcate. Using this information we set up dummy variables to identify dropouts
at a certain level and those with graduate degrees. Since we also have information
on the year in which persons left the educational system, we are further able to
calculate exact years of education.
A cross-tabulation of degrees obtained by completed years of schooling is pro-
vided by Table II. About 47% of the individuals in our sample completed upper
secondary school and another 37% completed university. Note that these numbers
are similar to those reported in aggregate statistics (JIL-Tokyo 2001). About 42%
of the individuals who completed only upper secondary school report exactly 12
years of schooling, 9% ﬁnished in less than 12 years, and 49% report 13 years of
schooling. Among those who ﬁnished junior college, 70% needed exactly 14 years
of schooling. The remaining 30% report more than 14 years of education. Finally,
among those who received at least a Bachelor degree, about 5% took less than 16
years of education, 33% took 16 years and more than 62% needed more than 16
years.
Our empirical strategy closely follows Jaeger and Page (1996) in order to facilitate
comparison between the US and Japan. The baseline speciﬁcation does not include
6diploma eﬀects, i.e.:
lnYi = α1 X
 
i + β1 S
 
i +  i . (1)
where Yi denotes gross yearly labor earnings of individual i3, including all compo-
nents of labor earnings that are crucial for an analysis of Japanese earnings such as
the base wage, allowances, mid-year and year-end bonuses, and overtime compen-
sation. Xi is a vector of control variables other than schooling. In each model, Xi
includes a quadratic in labor market experience and four year dummies. In a diﬀer-
ent speciﬁcation we further add a quadratic in ﬁrm tenure. Labor market experience
is measured as years since leaving full-time education. Firm tenure is measured us-
ing explicit information on how long a person is actually employed in the current
ﬁrm provided by the data. The vector Si includes diﬀerent variables indicating the
years of completed schooling. We consider two diﬀerent speciﬁcations: (i) we use a
continuous measure of the years of completed schooling, and (ii) we present results
from a speciﬁcation where the vector Si consists of dummy variables for each year
of completed schooling with 0-9 years of schooling as reference group. Finally,   is
a normal distributed error term with mean 0 and variance σ2. Descriptive statistics
on all variables used in the empirical analysis are provided in Appendix Table (1).
To investigate the existence of sheepskin eﬀects, we add to the baseline speciﬁ-
cation described by equation (1) a vector Di of dummy variables measuring degree
eﬀects, i.e., we estimate:
lnYi = α2 X
 




i +  i . (2)
Whereas the estimated β1’s from equation (1) could be interpreted as total returns to
education, the estimated β2’s from equation (2) show the total returns to schooling
net of degree eﬀects. Hence, the diﬀerence between the estimated β1 and β2 could
be interpreted as the part of the total returns to education that is due to sheepskin
7eﬀects (Jaeger and Page 1996). Similar to the speciﬁcation chosen by Jaeger and
Page (1996), we assume that those individuals with some junior college or some
university have completed high school. Thus, we set the high school dummy equal
to 1 for those with schooling beyond high school.4 The reported coeﬃcients on the
diploma dummies which are beyond high school therefore could be interpreted as
the marginal eﬀect over a high school degree.
To test whether there are signiﬁcant diﬀerences between small and large ﬁrms,
we fully interacted equations (1) and (2) with two ﬁrm size dummies, diﬀerentiating
small ﬁrms with less than 100 employees from large ﬁrms with at least 100 employees.
In 1,169 cases (41.5% of all observations), individuals report to be working for a
small ﬁrm; in the remaining 1,645 cases (58.5% of all observations) they report to
be employed in a ﬁrm with more than 100 employees.
Finally, to test the hypothesis of employer learning, we add interaction terms
between the vector of schooling diplomas, Di, with ﬁrm tenure, i.e., we estimate
lnYi = α2 X
 




i + λ (Di · Ti)
  +  i , (3)
where Ti denotes ﬁrm tenure. Similar to equations (1) and (2), we also report results
when equation (3) is fully interacted with two ﬁrm size dummies. As already noted
above, we expect λ to be negative, especially for small ﬁrms.
Estimation Results
Columns (1), (3), and (5) of Table III report the results obtained from estimating
equation (1), and columns (2), (4), and (6) those from equation (2). All estimations
are performed using OLS on the pooled data.5 The total returns of receiving a
particular degree beyond upper secondary are reported at the bottom of Table III.
The estimated coeﬃcient on completed years of schooling reported in column
8(1) of Table III indicates that one additional year of schooling increases gross yearly
earnings by roughly 7%. This return reduces to 3% when degree eﬀects are added to
the speciﬁcation (see column (2)). Hence, according to these estimates more than
50% of the total returns to schooling in Japan are due to sheepskin eﬀects. The
return to a high school degree is estimated to be 26%, which is considerably higher
than the respective return of about 11% obtained by Jaeger and Page (1996) for the
US.6
Receiving a junior college degree or attending some university without receiving
a degree does not have signiﬁcant additional eﬀects to a high school diploma, indi-
cating that a junior college degree and being accepted to university does not create
a signal that is rewarded by the labor market. The marginal eﬀect of receiving a
university degree above a high school degree is, however, highly signiﬁcant and es-
timated to be about 20%; almost 10 percentage points lower than the comparable
eﬀect in the US. Even though the Japanese recruitment system for university grad-
uates lowers the returns to an university degree if compared to the US – which is
in line with the expectations derived from the screening hypothesis – we still ﬁnd
signiﬁcant sheepskin eﬀects.
Using dummy variables for completed years of schooling rather than the continu-
ous measure does not have signiﬁcant eﬀects on the estimation results. Columns (3)
and (4) indicate again that sheepskin eﬀects account on average for about 50% of the
total returns to schooling. To illustrate this result in more detail, Figure 1 graphs
the estimated returns to years of schooling obtained from the speciﬁcations reported
in columns (3) and (4) of Table III. According to Figure 1, sheepskin eﬀects explain
about 43% of the return to completing 14 years of schooling and around 46% of the
return to completing 16 years and 18 and more years of schooling, respectively.
The point estimates for the returns of a high school degree and the marginal
9eﬀect of receiving a university degree are somewhat lower than those reported in
column (2). The total returns to the diﬀerent degrees are 18% for a high school
degree, 15% for completing junior college, 24% for attending some university, and
38% for completing university (see bottom of Table III). Controlling in addition for
ﬁrm tenure lowers the point estimates for the returns to completed years of schooling.
Whereas this change in the speciﬁcation does not signiﬁcantly aﬀect the returns to a
university diploma, the returns to a high school degree become insigniﬁcant. These
changes in the estimation results could be explained with the relative importance of
ﬁrm-speciﬁc human capital in the Japanese labor market.7
Table IV report the results when we fully interact equations (1) and (2) with the
two ﬁrm-size dummies. We report only results that correspond to the speciﬁcations
reported in column (4) and (6) of Table III.8 For both speciﬁcations we further
present the ﬁrm-size diﬀerences in the estimated coeﬃcients.
Our estimation results indicate that sheepskin eﬀects are limited to workers in
small ﬁrms. For workers in large ﬁrms we do not ﬁnd signiﬁcant sheepskin eﬀects
on earnings. Note further that the estimated marginal returns of a university degree
above a high school diploma in small ﬁrms of 26% in the speciﬁcation reported in
column (1) and 32% in column (2) of Table IV are comparable to those reported by
Jaeger and Page (1996) for the US. The statistically signiﬁcant positive coeﬃcient for
university dropouts employed in small ﬁrms indicate, that being accepted to attend
university appears to have a signaling value for small ﬁrms, which is comparable
to the signaling value of receiving a university degree. The point estimates for the
returns to completed years of schooling are higher in large ﬁrms if compared to
small ﬁrms and only for large ﬁrms these returns are statistically signiﬁcant.9 Note,
however, that in most cases the estimated coeﬃcients for small and large ﬁrms are
not statistically signiﬁcant diﬀerent from each other.
10Table V reports the results obtained from estimating equation (3). Referring to
column (3) of Table V, the results from this speciﬁcation indicate that sheepskin
eﬀects are decreasing with ﬁrm tenure, especially for small ﬁrms and for individuals
that have completed junior college. Note that the estimated coeﬃcients for the con-
trol variables other than the degree dummies and the interaction variables reported
in Table V do not change signiﬁcantly if compared to the respective speciﬁcations in
Tables III and IV. Table VI shows the estimated sheepskin eﬀects for the models in
Table V evaluated at 0, 5, 10, and 15 years of ﬁrm tenure. The table conﬁrms that
the sheepskin eﬀects are decreasing with increasing ﬁrm tenure, which gives some
support to the learning hypothesis. Furthermore, signiﬁcant sheepskin eﬀects and
the decrease of these eﬀects with tenure appear only in small ﬁrms (see column 3 of
Table VI).
Summary
Using individual-level data for the period from 1993 to 1997, this paper investigates
the existence of sheepskin eﬀects in Japan. Due to the particular recruitment system
of large companies in Japan, which screen potential employees through exams and
interviews while they are still at the university, we expect smaller sheepskin eﬀects
for Japanese workers employed in large ﬁrms. Our estimation results conﬁrm this
expectation. Not diﬀerentiating between small and large ﬁrms we ﬁnd signiﬁcant
sheepskin eﬀects. Sheepskin eﬀects account on average for about 50% of the total
returns to schooling. The estimated total returns to the diﬀerent degrees are 18%
for a high school degree, 15% for completing junior college, 24% for attending some
university, and 38% for completing university. These eﬀects are smaller than com-
parable estimates for the US. Diﬀerentiating sheepskin eﬀects by ﬁrm size indicates,
11that sheepskin eﬀect are more important for workers in small ﬁrms. Furthermore
the sheepskin eﬀects for workers in small companies appear to similar in size than
comparable eﬀects in the US. Finally, the estimation results indicate that the im-
portance of sheepskin eﬀects in small Japanese ﬁrms decrease with increasing ﬁrm
tenure of an individual. This result gives some support to the learning hypothesis
that the diploma eﬀects should decline with increasing tenure, because employers
gradually obtain better information on the true productivity of a worker.
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14Notes
1See, among others, Layard and Psacharopoulos (1974), Hungerford and Solon
(1987), Belman and Heywood (1991), Belman and Heywood (1997), Card and
Krueger (1992), Heywood (1994), Jaeger and Page (1996), Gullason (1999) and
Park (1999).
2See Dross and Haisken-DeNew (2002) for a detailed description of the data set.
3Available starting in 1993, units are 10,000 Yen per year.
4For example, the dummy variables for “junior high school”, “high school” and
“university dropout” are set equal to 1 if individuals have ﬁnished High School and
started University without receiving a certiﬁcate.
5In a diﬀerent speciﬁcation we made use of the panel character of the data set
by estimating random eﬀects models in order to account for unobserved individual
heterogeneity. The results from the random eﬀects model, which are available upon
request, are not reported, because the main results do not change if compared to
those described below.
6The percentage increase in gross yearly earnings associated with a dummy vari-
able coeﬃcient is calculated as eˆ γ − 1, where ˆ γ is the estimated coeﬃcient.
7See also Hashimoto and Raisian (1985), Clark and Ogawa (1992), and Dross
and Haisken-DeNew (2002) for empirical evidence on the role of employment tenure
for wages in Japan.
8The results for all other speciﬁcations are available upon request.
9These results are similar to those of Heywood (1994), who analyzed diﬀerences of
sheepskin eﬀects between workers in union and nonunion ﬁrms and between workers
in the public and the private sector. Heywood (1994) ﬁnds signiﬁcant sheepskin
eﬀects only for private nonunion workers.
15Table I: Educational System in Japan
Typical Years Typical Total Years Typical Age
Type of Degree of Schooling of Schooling
Compulsory Education
Elementary 6 6 6 - 12
Lower Secondary 3 9 12 - 15
Secondary and Higher Education
Upper Secondary 3 12 15 - 18
Junior College 2 14 18 - 20
University (Undergraduate) 4 16 18 - 22
University (Graduate) 3 19 22 - 25
Source: JIL-Tokyo (2001)
Table II: Highest Degree by Completed Years of Schooling
Lower Upper Upper Junior University University Total (in %)
Years of Secondary Secondary Secondary College
Schooling: Dropout Completed Completed Dropout Completed
0 - 9 112 9 4 0 0 0 125 (4.4)
10 44 48 25 0 0 0 117 (4.2)
11 10 36 92 0 0 0 138 (4.9)
12 0 6 551 0 14 2 573 (20.4)
13 0 7 647 0 9 10 673 (23.9)
1 4 0006 0 2 0 1 0 9 0 ( 3 . 2 )
1 5 0001 5 1 2 3 0 5 7 ( 2 . 0 )
16 0 0 0 0 7 342 349 (12.4)
17 0 0 0 5 17 373 395 (14.0)
18 or more 0 0 0 6 6 285 297 (10.6)
Total 166 106 1319 86 85 1052 2814 (100.0)
(in %) (5.9) (3.8) (46.9) (3.1) (3.0) (37.4) (100.0)
Mean Years
of Schooling 9.4 10.6 12.4 14.6 14.8 16.8 - -
Source: Japanese Household Panel 1993-1997, own calculations.
16Table III: Sheepskin Eﬀects in Japan
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Upper Secondary Dropout - 0.152** - 0.165*** - 0.122**
(0.062) (0.063) (0.059)
Upper Secondary Completed - 0.231*** - 0.168** - 0.099
(0.050) (0.072) (0.072)
Marginal Eﬀects over Upper Secondary:
Junior College Completed - -0.034 - -0.028 - 0.030
(0.050) (0.092) (0.102)
University Dropout - 0.044 - 0.045 - 0.095
(0.057) (0.062) (0.073)
University Completed - 0.179*** - 0.155* - 0.193**
(0.050) (0.088) (0.095)
Years of Schooling 0.067*** 0.030*** - - - -
(0.004) (0.009)
10 Years - - 0.064 -0.024 0.068 0.008
(0.066) (0.064) (0.057) (0.055)
11 Years - - 0.173*** 0.035 0.142*** 0.055
(0.064) (0.076) (0.053) (0.073)
12 Years - - 0.294*** 0.142* 0.222*** 0.132*
(0.055) (0.080) (0.046) (0.076)
13 Years - - 0.336*** 0.183** 0.268*** 0.177**
(0.053) (0.079) (0.044) (0.076)
14 Years - - 0.365*** 0.207* 0.279*** 0.131
(0.063) (0.114) (0.055) (0.119)
15 Years - - 0.396*** 0.162 0.323*** 0.107
(0.081) (0.124) (0.073) (0.126)
16 Years - - 0.651*** 0.349*** 0.548*** 0.272**
(0.059) (0.122) (0.052) (0.125)
17 Years - - 0.568*** 0.270** 0.490*** 0.218*
(0.059) (0.119) (0.050) (0.122)
18 Years - - 0.656*** 0.357*** 0.572*** 0.297**
(0.059) (0.120) (0.051) (0.123)
Experience 0.045*** 0.042*** 0.040*** 0.039*** 0.024*** 0.023***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Experience2×10−2 -0.078*** -0.065*** -0.060*** -0.055** -0.043* -0.039*
(0.024) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023)
Tenure - - - - 0.020*** 0.020***
(0.005) (0.005)
Tenure2×10−2 - - - - -0.015 -0.014
(0.024) (0.025)
Constant 4.740*** 4.994*** 5.306*** 5.295*** 5.383*** 5.378***
(0.084) (0.118) (0.071) (0.070) (0.064) (0.064)
Adjusted-R2 0.25 0.26 0.26 0.27 0.32 0.32
Total Returns to Diploma
over Upper Secondary:
Junior College Completed - 0.197*** - 0.141 - 0.129
(0.074) (0.116) (0.123)
University Dropout - 0.275*** - 0.214** - 0.195*
(0.076) (0.093) (0.100)
University Completed - 0.410*** - 0.324*** - 0.292**
(0.083) (0.112) (0.117)
Source: Japanese Household Panel 1993-1997, own calculations. Notes: Regression includes four year dummies;
2,814 observations of 735 individuals. Dependent variable is gross yearly labor earnings, including bonuses, units
of 10,000 Yen. Standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are corrected for the possibility that individual
observations are not independent over time. *: signiﬁcant at least at the 10%-level. **: signiﬁcant at least at the
5%-level. ***: signiﬁcant at least at the 1%-level.
17Table IV: Sheepskin Eﬀects by Firm Size
(1) (2)
Small Firm Large Firm Diﬀerence Small Firm Large Firm Diﬀerence
Upper Secondary Dropout 0.153** 0.142 0.011 0.142** 0.085 0.056
(0.071) (0.208) (0.217) (0.064) (0.203) (0.211)
Upper Secondary Completed 0.095 0.235* -0.139 0.084 0.162 -0.078
(0.093) (0.124) (0.152) (0.092) (0.126) (0.154)
Marginal Eﬀects over Upper Secondary:
Junior College Completed -0.071 -0.140 0.069 0.049 -0.124 0.172
(0.108) (0.132) (0.162) (0.136) (0.130) (0.187)
University Dropout 0.230*** -0.112 0.341*** 0.277*** -0.084 0.360***
(0.042) (0.091) (0.098) (0.068) (0.093) (0.121)
University Completed 0.192* 0.036 0.155 0.276** 0.039 0.236
(0.114) (0.120) (0.156) (0.117) (0.120) (0.167)
10 Years 0.015 0.086 -0.070 0.018 0.096 -0.078
(0.068) (0.169) (0.180) (0.057) (0.156) (0.164)
11 Years 0.060 0.019 0.040 0.040 0.061 -0.021
(0.089) (0.148) (0.170) (0.082) (0.144) (0.164)
12 Years 0.129 0.155 -0.025 0.106 0.165 -0.058
(0.101) (0.141) (0.169) (0.098) (0.132) (0.162)
13 Years 0.157 0.190 -0.032 0.125 0.211 -0.085
(0.102) (0.138) (0.167) (0.099) (0.129) (0.160)
14 Years 0.164 0.318* -0.153 0.051 0.301* -0.249
(0.139) (0.187) (0.224) (0.151) (0.180) (0.233)
15 Years -0.108 0.330* -0.438* -0.216 0.347* -0.563**
(0.127) (0.197) (0.230) (0.137) (0.187) (0.233)
16 Years 0.216 0.479** -0.262 0.096 0.470*** -0.373
(0.168) (0.186) (0.242) (0.168) (0.178) (0.243)
17 Years 0.033 0.449** -0.416* -0.066 0.455*** -0.520**
(0.156) (0.184) (0.231) (0.157) (0.176) (0.233)
18 Years 0.296* 0.481*** -0.184 0.172 0.486*** -0.313
(0.155) (0.186) (0.233) (0.159) (0.178) (0.236)
Experience 0.036*** 0.039*** -0.003 0.021** 0.027*** -0.006
(0.011) (0.008) (0.012) (0.010) (0.009) (0.013)
Experience2 × 10−2 -0.077** -0.031 -0.045 -0.047 -0.018 -0.029
(0.035) (0.024) (0.040) (0.031) (0.030) (0.041)
Tenure - - - 0.024*** 0.017** 0.007
(0.006) (0.008) (0.009)
Tenure2 × 10−2 - - - -0.053 -0.028 -0.024
(0.033) (0.035) (0.045)
Constant 5.392*** -0.164 - 5.428*** -0.152 -
(0.095) (0.158) (0.090) (0.141)
Adjusted R2 0.33 0.35
Total Returns to Diploma
over Upper Secondary:
Junior College Completed 0.024 0.095 -0.070 0.133 0.038 0.095
(0.141) (0.181) (0.222) (0.164) (0.179) (0.242)
University Dropout 0.325*** 0.123 0.202 0.361*** 0.078 0.282
(0.100) (0.154) (0.181) (0.113) (0.152) (0.193)
University Completed 0.287** 0.271 0.016 0.360** 0.201 0.158
(0.146) (0.172) (0.218) (0.148) (0.171) (0.226)
Source: Japanese Household Panel 1993-1997, own calculations. Notes: Regression includes four year dummies;
2,814 observations of 735 individuals. Dependent variable is gross yearly labor earnings, including bonuses, units
of 10,000 Yen. Standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are corrected for the possibility that individual
observations are not independent over time. *: signiﬁcant at least at the 10%-level. **: signiﬁcant at least at the
5%-level. ***: signiﬁcant at least at the 1%-level.
18Table V: Sheepskin Eﬀects and Firm Tenure
(1) (2) (3)
Small Firms Large Firms Diﬀerence
Upper Secondary Dropout 0.247*** 0.250*** 0.247*** 0.538 -0.291
(0.084) (0.089) (0.091) (0.446) (0.447)
Upper Secondary Dropout × Tenure -0.016** -0.016** -0.014* -0.050 0.036
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.051) (0.050)
Upper Secondary Completed 0.207*** 0.156* 0.184* 0.302* -0.118
(0.061) (0.085) (0.105) (0.159) (0.188)
Upper Secondary Completed × Tenure -0.008* -0.008* -0.013** -0.012* -0.001
(0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.007) (0.009)
Marginal Eﬀects over Upper Secondary:
Junior College Completed 0.013 0.083 0.230 -0.040 0.270
(0.066) (0.119) (0.146) (0.158) (0.212)
Junior College Completed × Tenure -0.005 -0.005 -0.021** -0.007 -0.014
(0.006) (0.007) (0.009) (0.008) (0.012)
University Dropout 0.037 0.052 0.221* -0.215* 0.436***
(0.118) (0.114) (0.114) (0.112) (0.156)
University Dropout × Tenure 0.001 0.004 0.009 0.012 -0.003
(0.011) (0.010) (0.013) (0.008) (0.013)
University Completed 0.086 0.126 0.252* -0.010 0.261
(0.064) (0.109) (0.135) (0.138) (0.192)
University Completed × Tenure 0.007* 0.006 0.005 0.005 0.000
(0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.005) (0.008)
Years of Scholling 0.031*** - - - -
(0.009)
10 Years - 0.003 0.011 0.083 -0.072
(0.055) (0.055) (0.179) (0.186)
11 Years - 0.061 0.027 0.074 -0.047
(0.073) (0.082) (0.165) (0.183)
12 Years - 0.137* 0.094 0.177 -0.083
(0.076) (0.096) (0.154) (0.181)
13 Years - 0.179** 0.114 0.218 -0.104
(0.076) (0.098) (0.151) (0.179)
14 Years - 0.133 -0.029 0.312 -0.341
(0.128) (0.151) (0.205) (0.255)
15 Years - 0.118 -0.271* 0.362* -0.633**
(0.132) (0.153) (0.207) (0.260)
16 Years - 0.278** 0.065 0.478** -0.412
(0.131) (0.163) (0.201) (0.258)
17 Years - 0.232* -0.087 0.466** -0.554**
(0.129) (0.160) (0.199) (0.254)
18 Years - 0.314** 0.159 0.501** -0.342
(0.129) (0.159) (0.200) (0.255)
Experience 0.023*** 0.022*** 0.024** 0.025*** -0.001
(0.007) (0.007) (0.010) (0.009) (0.013)
Experience2 × 10−2 -0.041* -0.036 -0.058* -0.007 -0.052
(0.024) (0.024) (0.031) (0.031) (0.042)
Tenure 0.024*** 0.024*** 0.032*** 0.028*** 0.004
(0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.011) (0.013)
Tenure2 × 10−2 -0.006 -0.006 -0.039 -0.032 -0.007
(0.024) (0.025) (0.033) (0.036) (0.047)
Constant 5.056*** 5.349*** 5.344*** -0.188 -
(0.120) (0.078) (0.100) (0.180)
Adjusted R2 0.32 0.32 0.36
Source: Japanese Household Panel 1993-1997, own calculations. Notes: Regression includes four year dummies;
2,814 observations of 735 individuals. Dependent variable is gross yearly labor earnings, including bonuses, units
of 10,000 Yen. Standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are corrected for the possibility that individual
observations are not independent over time. *: signiﬁcant at least at the 10%-level. **: signiﬁcant at least at the
5%-level. ***: signiﬁcant at least at the 1%-level.
19Table VI: Cumulative Sheepskin Eﬀects by Firm Tenure
Firm Tenure (1) (2) (3)
(Years)
Small Firms Large Firms
Junior College Completed 0 0.220** 0.239* 0.414** 0.262
(0.086) (0.141) (0.177) (0.215)
5 0.154** 0.175 0.247 0.167
(0.070) (0.131) (0.159) (0.200)
10 0.088 0.111 0.079 0.071
(0.069) (0.131) (0.156) (0.197)
15 0.022 0.047 0.089 0.024
(0.085) (0.140) (0.169) (0.205)
University Dropouts 0 0.243** 0.208 0.406*** 0.087
(0.128) (0.136) (0.153) (0.181)
5 0.211** 0.191* 0.387*** 0.089
(0.088) (0.109) (0.123) (0.169)
10 0.178** 0.174 0.368*** 0.090
(0.075) (0.106) (0.126) (0.170)
15 0.145 0.158 0.350** 0.091
(0.100) (0.129) (0.161) (0.185)
University Completed 0 0.292*** 0.282** 0.436*** 0.293
(0.093) (0.133) (0.168) (0.199)
5 0.290*** 0.275** 0.394** 0.254
(0.081) (0.126) (0.154) (0.189)
10 0.288*** 0.268** 0.352** 0.216
(0.078) (0.124) (0.149) (0.187)
15 0.286*** 0.262** 0.310** 0.178
(0.083) (0.129) (0.153) (0.193)
Source: Japanese Household Panel 1993-1997, own calculations. Notes: Calculations are based on the estimated
coeﬃcients from Table V. Standard errors in parentheses. *: signiﬁcant at least at the 10%-level. **: signiﬁcant at
least at the 5%-level. ***: signiﬁcant at least at the 1%-level.
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21Appendix Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
Total Small Firms Large Firms
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
High School Dropout 0.038 0.190 0.075 0.264 0.011 0.104
High School Completed 0.469 0.499 0.522 0.500 0.431 0.495
Junior College Completed 0.031 0.172 0.022 0.148 0.036 0.188
University Dropout 0.030 0.171 0.052 0.222 0.015 0.120
University Completed 0.374 0.484 0.210 0.407 0.491 0.500
Years of Schooling 13.990 2.733 13.039 2.715 14.666 2.537
9 Years 0.042 0.200 0.084 0.277 0.012 0.107
10 Years 0.049 0.216 0.073 0.260 0.032 0.177
11 Years 0.204 0.403 0.235 0.424 0.181 0.385
13 Years 0.239 0.427 0.252 0.435 0.230 0.421
14 Years 0.032 0.176 0.030 0.170 0.033 0.180
15 Years 0.020 0.141 0.015 0.123 0.024 0.152
16 Years 0.124 0.330 0.064 0.245 0.167 0.373
17 Years 0.140 0.347 0.093 0.291 0.174 0.379
18 Years 0.106 0.307 0.067 0.250 0.133 0.340
Experience 13.769 5.589 14.459 5.614 13.279 5.521
Tenure 9.674 6.179 8.021 5.878 10.849 6.119
1994 0.197 0.398 0.202 0.402 0.194 0.395
1995 0.200 0.400 0.203 0.402 0.198 0.398
1996 0.200 0.400 0.192 0.394 0.205 0.404
1997 0.192 0.394 0.174 0.379 0.205 0.404
Observations 2,814 1,169 1,645
Source: Japanese Household Panel 1993-1997, own calculations.
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